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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between money and inﬂation in a small open econ-
omy, where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes as means of payment. It
is shown that, if the path of domestic money supply is such that individuals ﬁnd it optimal
to change the currency in which transactions are settled, there will be an adjustment period
during which domestic inﬂation adjusts to equal the foreign inﬂation rate. The model cap-
tures the stylized fact that temporary increases in the inﬂation rate may have permanent
eﬀects in the use of foreign currency, even without the introduction of dollarization costs.
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1. Introduction
In high inﬂation countries, the rapid erosion of the value of domestic currency
leads agents to substitute it with foreign currency in any or all of the basic func-
tions of money. This phenomenon is usually called currency substitution, or simply
dollarization (for a literature review, see Giovannini and Turtelboom, 1994). A
question that has attracted increasing attention is that, in some cases, dollarization
exhibits hysteresis, with the demand for foreign currency remaining high after sta-
bilization (for empirical evidence, see Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992; Kamin and
Ericsson, 2003; Clements and Schwartz, 1993; Mueller, 1994; Reding and Morales,
1999). However, this is not always the case. In some economies of Eastern Europe,
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for example, dollarization has fallen substantially in the aftermath of successful
stabilization plans (Sahay and Ve´gh, 1996).
This paper follows Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992); Uribe (1997), and Reding
and Morales (1999), addressing the issue of dollarization hysteresis with a small
open economy model where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes
as means of payment. Our approach contributes to the literature in two main
respects. Firstly, we allow the inﬂation rate to be endogenous. Secondly, we are
able to explain the phenomenon of dollarization hysteresis even in the absence of
dollarization costs.
Previous explanations for the phenomenon of dollarization hysteresis have
emphasized the role of dollarization costs. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) and
Dornbusch et al. (1990) argued that the process of ﬁnancial adaptation involves
learning costs that, once incurred by economic agents, imply persistence. Guidotti
and Rodriguez (1992) present a model with perfect means of payment substitut-
ability, in which agents face costs of adjusting their holdings of foreign currency.
These costs result in an inﬂation band within which agents choose not to switch
between currencies. Hence, de-dollarization may only be achieved if domestic
inﬂation decreases enough to oﬀset the switching costs. Perfect means of payment
substitutability was also assumed by Uribe (1997) and Reding and Morales (1999),
who stressed the role of network externalities as the source of non-linearities in the
relationship between money demand and inﬂation. According to this interpret-
ation, transaction costs faced by individual agents decline with the aggregate level
of dollarization, giving rise to multiple equilibria and history dependence in the
demand for money. Thus, a temporary high level of inﬂation can start a dollariza-
tion process which will not necessarily be reversed when inﬂation comes down, as
network economies will provide agents with a permanent lowering of transaction
costs in the use of foreign currency.
Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992); Uribe (1997), and Reding and Morales (1999)
have two important shortcomings. First, the inﬂation rate is assumed to be exogen-
ous. As changes in the money demand impact on the inﬂation rate, the dynamic
analysis made by these authors may be misleading. Second, these approaches
involve the speciﬁcation of dollarization cost functions, which are necessarily ad-hoc.
In this paper we argue that the short-term dynamics of money and inﬂation
under the assumption of perfect means of payment substitutability is suﬃciently
rich to capture the diﬀerent patterns of dollarization identiﬁed in the empirical
literature, without the need to introduce dollarization costs. A well known result
with perfect substitutability is that, without binding constraints on currency hold-
ings, the exchange rate is undetermined (Kareken and Wallace, 1981). In short, any
monetary equilibrium with two currencies coexisting in the same commodity
domain requires their user costs (inﬂation rates) to be equal. Under these circum-
stances, the demand for each currency is undetermined and so, too, will be the
(unchanging) exchange rate. The same mechanism that produces exchange rate
indeterminacy in Kareken and Wallace (1981) is at work here, but our model dif-
fers in that residents of both countries face binding constraints in the use of cur-
rencies. In particular, we assume that foreign residents are not allowed to hold the
domestic currency (only asymmetric currency substitution is considered) and a
minimum constraint on the amount of domestic money holdings is imposed.1 In
this framework, money demand indeterminacy occurs only when money supplies
evolve at the same rate. We show, however, that if money growth rates evolve in
such a way that currency substitution becomes optimal, there will be a period of
time during which the domestic inﬂation adjusts to equal the foreign inﬂation rate.
We also show that the demand for foreign currency does not necessarily decline
when a disinﬂation program is implemented in a dollarized economy. If, however,
reversibility occurs (partial or total), the demand for foreign currency will decline
smoothly, contrasting with the once-and-for-all change in the inﬂation rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
present the model. In Section 3, we discuss the dynamics of inﬂation and currency
substitution. In Section 4, we discuss the possible outcomes of a disinﬂation pro-
gram. Conclusions are presented in Section 5.
2. The model
Consider a small open economy that operates under ﬂexible exchange rates and
perfect capital mobility. Time is continuous. There exists only one international
indexed bond and one consumption good, and purchasing power parity holds
instantaneously. The economy is inhabited by a ﬁxed number N of atomistic indi-
viduals who are blessed with perfect foresight and inﬁnite life. Individuals max-
imize their lifetime utility function subject to a wealth constraint. For simplicity, in
each instant individuals receive a ﬁxed real income, and the real return of the
indexed bond is equal to the rate of time preference. Transactions may be carried
out by using both domestic and foreign money, the two currencies being intrinsi-
cally useless and perfect substitutes as means of payment. Foreign residents do not
hold domestic money balances.
The consumption good may be purchased either with P units of domestic cur-
rency (M) or P units of foreign currency (F). The liquidity constraint requires pur-
chases to be made with money held at the time of the transaction and broad
money velocity is set equal to one. In real per capita terms:
mt þ ft ¼ 1 ð1Þ
where mt ¼Mt=NPt and ft ¼ Ft=NPt are the home country per capita holdings of
domestic and foreign real money balances at time t, and 1 refers to the normalized
per capita consumption level.2
1 The rationale is that there are transactions, such as tax payments and transactions involving the
government, that in general cannot be settled in foreign currency. Empirically, stubbornness of domestic
money has been observed, even during extremely high inﬂation rates, such as the German hyperinﬂation
(Giovannini and Turtelboom, 1994).
2 Inﬂation taxes impact on the consumption level as a wealth eﬀect. Since the real interest rate is equal
to the rate of time preference, the optimal consumption is constant over time, so that the normalization
above does not involve loss of generality.
To capture the existence of institutional limits to dollarization (e.g. transactions
involving the government or closely monitored by it, that cannot be settled in
foreign currency), it is assumed that the amount of transactions carried out with
domestic currency cannot fall below a minimum level, m. This assumption,
together with (1) and the observation that money is dominated by an interest-bear-
ing bond, implies that, for all t:
m  mt  1: ð2Þ
When agents decide upon their cash holdings, they take the inﬂation path as
given, because individually they cannot change the price level. The money demand
path that achieves the highest consumption level is the one that minimizes the
wealth erosion caused by the inﬂation taxes. Since domestic and foreign currencies
are perfect substitutes and (2) deﬁnes a closed control set, the per capita demand
for domestic money balances becomes:
mt ¼
1 if pt < p
any if pt ¼ p
m if pt > p
8<
: ð3Þ
where pt ¼ _Pt

Pt and pt ¼ _Pt

Pt . This is a common arbitrage condition, stating
that the domestic currency holdings of a representative individual will be respect-
ively 1, any allowed amount or m, as the domestic inﬂation is lower, equal to or
higher than the foreign inﬂation rate. An implication is that, for any currency sub-
stitution to occur in this model, the domestic and foreign inﬂation rates must be
equal, because only in that case will individuals hold a positive amount of both
currencies.
The nominal money supply is assumed to be a continuous function of time.
Denoting its rate of change by lt ¼ _M t

Mt, the real money stock evolves accord-
ing to:
_mt ¼ lt  ptð Þmt: ð4Þ
The paths of domestic inﬂation and real money balances are determined such that
the aggregate real money demand and supply are equal. Due to the small country
assumption, the domestic demand for foreign currency does not impact on the
foreign inﬂation rate.
Equilibrium in this model may be deﬁned in the following way:
Deﬁnition 1. (monetary equilibrium). An equilibrium is given by a time-continuous
function mt for the individual agent and a function pt for the whole economy such
that, given the nominal rate of money growth, lt, eqs. (3) and (4) are continuously
satisﬁed.
In Deﬁnition 1, the real value of domestic money balances is required to be con-
tinuous over time because the nominal money supply is time-continuous, and
jumps in the price level are ruled out by the assumptions of perfect foresight and
no arbitrage.
In the following discussion, it will be useful to take as a benchmark the trivial
solutions corresponding to time-invariant paths of l:
Deﬁnition 2. (trivial equilibria). When lt ¼ l for all t, the equilibrium path of mt is
time-invariant and given by: (i) mt ¼ m if l > p; (ii) mt ¼ 1 if l < p; (iii) mt any
in (2) if l ¼ p.
To see this, we ﬁrst note that any path with _m 6¼ 0 cannot be an equilibrium.
Indeed, given the money demand (3), any non-horizontal path of m would only be
possible if p ¼ p. However, from eq. (4), the only way to achieve this when l ¼ p
(case iii) is with a constant money demand. By the same reasoning, the equality of
inﬂation rates in case (i) [(ii)], would require the money demand to grow [decline]
exponentially forever, which is ruled out by (2). Hence, only horizontal money
demand paths are allowed and, in these cases, we know from (4) that the domestic
inﬂation rate is equal to the rate of money creation.
Since in cases (i) and (ii) domestic and foreign inﬂation rates diﬀer, the optimal
money demands are corner solutions. In case (iii), however, inﬂation rates are
equal, so that any level of m is optimal from the individual point of view. In this
case, the two currencies are perfect substitutes on both the demand and the supply
side and, as in Kareken and Wallace (1981), there is a monetary equilibrium for
each possible (time-invariant) value of the exchange rate, P=P.
3. The dynamics of inﬂation and currency substitution
In this section, we explore the adjustment dynamics of the model when the money
supply path is such that individuals ﬁnd it optimal to alter their cash-holdings.
Proposition 1. (dynamics of inﬂation and currency substitution). If the domestic rate
of money growth increases linearly over time, according to lt ¼ lþ rt; with r > 0
and 0 < l < p, then the equilibrium paths of m and p are:
mt ¼
1 t < ~t
mexp
r
2
t2  p  lð Þtþ p
  lð Þ2
2r
" #
~t  t < t
m t 	 t
8>><
>>:
ð5Þ
and
pt ¼
lt < p
 t < ~t
p ~t  t  t
lt > p
 t > t
8<
: ð6Þ
where t ¼ plr and ~t ¼ t
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2lnm
r
q
.
Proof: The third line of eq. (5) is equivalent to the trivial solution (i) in Deﬁ-
nition 2. The intermediate segment is obtained using the non-arbitrage condition
pt ¼ p in (4) and solving for mt, imposing limt!tmt ¼ m. ~t is such that mð~tÞ ¼ 1:
To interpret Proposition 1 we refer to Fig. 1. We depict in the lower diagram the
inﬂation rate (heavy line) and the rate of money growth (thin line), and in the
upper diagram the money demand. Given the inﬂation path, individuals decide to
use only domestic currency in the ﬁrst segment, and the maximum allowed level of
foreign currency in the third segment. In the intermediate segment, currency substi-
tution takes place and the adjustment path is such that domestic and foreign
inﬂation rates are equal. If the money demand declined slower, or faster, the
inﬂation diﬀerential would not be zero, and no continuous path could be found
such that the individual money demands and supply were continuously satisﬁed.
Fig. 1. The dynamics of inﬂation and currency substitution.
Due to the upper limit in (2), individuals have to wait for the right moment, ~t, to
start the currency substitution process. The adjustment period, (t~t), is shorter
the higher is the minimum allowed proportion of domestic balances, m, and the
faster is the increase in the rate of money growth, r.
4. The dynamics of a disinﬂation program
To investigate the dynamics of a disinﬂation program, assume that initially the
domestic inﬂation rate is higher than the foreign inﬂation rate and that the initial
level of dollarization is f ¼ 1 m. The monetary authorities are assumed to reduce
linearly the rate of money growth until it reaches the foreign inﬂation rate. When
this is so, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. (dynamics of a disinﬂation program). If the domestic rate of money
growth follows lt ¼ l rt t <
t
p t 	 t ;


where l > p and t ¼ lpr , then there
exist inﬁnity of equilibrium paths for m and p given by:
mt ¼
m t < ~t
m tð Þexp  r
2
t2 þ l pð Þt l p
ð Þ2
2r
" #
~t  t < t
m tð Þ t 	 t
8>><
>>:
ð7Þ
and
pt ¼ l rt > p
 t < ~t
p t 	 ~t


ð8Þ
where m tð Þ is any in (2) and ~t ¼ t
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ln m=m tð Þð Þ
r
q
.
Proof: Identical to Proposition 1, except that in this case there is an equilibrium
for every possible (unchanging) value of m after t.
This case has multiple equilibria because after the disinﬂation program the two
currencies become perfect substitutes on the supply side, as in the trivial solution
(iii) of Deﬁnition 2.3 Hence, there exists a continuum of adjustment paths, corre-
sponding to each possible level of dollarization in the new steady state.
To illustrate Proposition 2 we refer to Fig. 2. The ﬁgure has two panels, (a) and
(b), each similar to Fig. 1. In panel (a) we depict the extreme case in which there is
no decline in the dollarization level. In this case, the domestic inﬂation rate is
always equal to the rate of money growth. In panel (b) we depict two possible
3 Of course, the indeterminacy occurs only when the disinﬂation program reduces the rate of money
growth exactly to the level of foreign inﬂation. However, the indeterminacy can easily be extended to a
range of money supply paths, introducing a simple network externality in the use of money. Such an
extension is available from the author upon request.
paths where the disinﬂation program leads to a decline in the level of dollarization.
The thin line depicts a case in which some dollarization remains at the end of the
adjustment program. The heavy line corresponds to the extreme case in which
the foreign currency is completely abandoned, that is, m tð Þ ¼ 1. In both cases the
demand for domestic money rises along the adjustment period, implying an
inﬂation rate lower than the rate of money creation and equal to the foreign
inﬂation rate, as required by the non-arbitrage condition. Since in the thin line case
the cash adjustment is smaller, the currency substitution process starts later (~t0 > ~tÞ.
Thus, unlike the situation in Proposition 1, the length of the adjustment period
(t~t) is not controllable by the monetary authorities. Because of the indetermi-
nacy, the policy parameter, r deﬁnes only an upper bound on the length of the
adjustment period.
If possible, a planner would choose the equilibrium path leading to m ¼ 1 (heavy
line in panel b), because in that case all seigniorage revenues would accrue to the
domestic economy. However, in a decentralized economy, there is no way of assur-
ing that this equilibrium will occur4
In all equilibria described by Proposition 2, the demand for foreign currency
fails to respond linearly to changes in the inﬂation rate, and this accords with the
4 Note that any small barrier to change, such as a lump sum switching cost, would lead to the less
favorable outcome, depicted in panel (a).
Fig. 2. The dynamics of a disinﬂation program.
empirical evidence. The equilibrium depicted in panel (a) captures the extreme case
in which the demand for foreign currency does not decline at all. The remaining
equilibria account for partial and full reversibility. In all of these cases, the demand
for foreign currency declines smoothly, following the once-and-for-all adjustment
of the inﬂation rate. The fall in the inﬂation rate does not help to predict, however,
the length of the adjustment period or the extent of de-dollarization that will be
achieved in the long run. Since the maximum length of the adjustment period
depends on the policy parameter r, a wide range of de-dollarization patterns may
be observed after the fall in the inﬂation rate.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the dynamics of money demand and inﬂation in a
small open economy, where domestic and foreign currencies are perfect substitutes
as means of payment. The main property of this model is that, if the path of
money supply is such that individuals ﬁnd it optimal to change the currency in
which transactions are settled, there will be an adjustment period during which the
domestic inﬂation rate adjusts to equal the foreign inﬂation rate. This implies that,
during the currency substitution process, the behavior of money demand is not
accounted for by changes in the current inﬂation rate. In the context of this model,
a temporary increase in the rate of money creation gives rise to a demand for
foreign currency that does not necessarily decline when the inﬂation rate comes
down. If, however, reversibility occurs (partial or total), the demand for foreign
currency will decline smoothly, contrasting with the once-and-for-all change in the
inﬂation rate. Therefore, the model is able to explain the failure of econometric
studies in identifying stable money-demand relationships in dollarized economies.
The model captures the diﬀerent patterns of dollarization identiﬁed in the litera-
ture, namely reversibility in some cases and non-reversibility in others. This does
not depend on any ad-hoc dollarization cost function. It is, instead, an obvious
consequence of the assumption of perfect substitutability. Reversibility in this con-
text is assured if the domestic currency becomes a better alternative than the
foreign currency. Such an event, however, may not be easy to achieve in most
developing economies. In these cases, co-existence will be the more likely outcome
of a successful stabilization plan, unless administrative actions are taken to banish
the foreign currency.
It may be argued that the knife-edge equilibria discussed in this paper are not
realistic. It is true that in the real world agents do not switch between currencies in
response to small inﬂation diﬀerentials. As mentioned above, however, the model
can easily be extended so as to better resemble reality, introducing some form of
dollarization costs. But there is nothing particularly new in such an extension that
makes it more attractive than the version discussed in this paper. On the contrary,
by focusing on the simpler model, we stress the main point that there are more
fundamental forces driving the behaviour of money demand than dollarization
costs, which are not even necessary to explain the stylized facts.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges William Perraudin, Anne Sibert and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments. Financial support from the Fundac¸a˜o para a Cieˆncia
e Tecnologia is also acknowledged. An earlier version of this paper was presented
in the 2000 Meeting of the Society of Economic Dynamics.
References
Clements, B., Schwartz, G., 1993. Currency substitution: the recent experience of Bolivia. World Devel-
opment 21 (11), 1883–1893.
Dornbusch, R., Reynoso, A., 1989. Financial factors in economic development. NBER Working Paper
No. 2889.
Dornbusch, R., Sturzenegger, F., Wolf, H., 1990. Extreme inﬂation: dynamics and stabilisation. Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 1–84.
Guidotti, P.E., Rodriguez, C.A., 1992. Dollarisation in Latin America: Gresham’s Law in reverse?
International Monetary Fund Staﬀ Papers 39 (3), 518–544.
Giovannini, A., Turtelboom, B., 1994. Currency substitution. In: Van Der Ploeg, F. (Ed.), The Hand-
book of International Macroeconomics. Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 390–436.
Kamin, S.B., Ericsson, N.R., 2003. Dollarisation in post-hyperinﬂationary Argentina. Journal of Inter-
national Money and Finance 22, 185–211.
Kareken, J., Wallace, N., 1981. On the indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rates. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 96, 207–222.
Mueller, J.,1994. Dollarisation in Lebanon. International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 129/94.
Reding, P., Morales, J.A., 1999. Currency substitution and network externalities. University of Namur,
mimeo. In: XII World Congress of the International Economic Association, Buenos Aires.
Sahay, R., Ve´gh, C., 1996. Dollarisation in transition economies: evidence and policy implications. In:
Mizen, P., Pentecost, E. (Eds.), The Macroeconomics of International Currencies: Theory, Policy
and Evidence. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 193–224.
Uribe, M., 1997. Hysteresis in a simple model of currency substitution. Journal of Monetary Economics
40, 185–202.
